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Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is
surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for
captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Piracy on the high seas typically conjures up visions of swash-
buckling adventurers from the pages of history (the economics and
internal organization of such pirates were examined in Leeson (2007,
2009a,b,c) and several forthcoming papers, among others1). Recently,
however, accounts of modern day pirate attacks and anti-piracy
measures have dominated world news. Modern piracy results in an
estimated worldwide loss of between 13 and 16 billion US dollars per
year.2 Reported pirate attacks trebled in the decade 1993–2003,
according to the International Maritime Bureau.3 Particularly vulner-
able areas include the Straits of Malacca, West Africa, the waters off
Somalia, Chittagong and the Indian Ocean.
Economists' analysis of organized crime began with Becker's
(1968) pioneering study of crime and punishment. Subsequent studies
of the impact and causes of organized crime or of optimal prevention
methods include Anderson (1979), Reuter (1983,1987), Jennings
(1984), Arlacchi (1986), Jankowski (1991), Dick (1995), Konrad and
Skaperdas (1998), Garoupa (2000), Skaperdas (2001), and Chang et al.
(2005). As Leeson (2007) points out, most literature on the economics
of organized crime has regarded suppliers of organized crime as
providing a service in the form of “protection” to others, and having a
monopoly on coercion (following Schelling (1971)). Leeson himself
looks at the internal organization of seventeenth and eighteenth-
century pirates— criminals who provided no services to any outsider.
To the best of our knowledge, however, research by economists on
modernhigh seas piracy is very limited. One such study is Anderson and
Marcouiller (2005) which examines a two-country Ricardian trade
model where individuals may choose between productive activity and
piracy, and shows that autarky obtains over a large parameter space.
In this paper we examine the options and decisions open to pirates
and merchants in a pirate-infested sea on which patrolling by
international maritime police foils some attempts at piracy with the
pirates being captured and punished. We show that in this scenario
(1) the merchant can insure himself against piracy,
(2) contrary to expectations, such self-insurance is not vulnerable
to moral hazard, and
(3) there exists a certain intensity of patrolling and/or certain
penalties for captured pirates which, with the help of the
merchant's incentive to self-insure, could eliminate piracy.
First, however, we look at some facts about modern piracy and
their bearing on our model.
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1 Although Leeson mentions contemporary pirates his papers do not model them as
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2 "Foreign Affairs – Terrorism Goes to Sea" – http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20041101faessay83606/gal-luft-anne-korin/terrorism-goes-to-sea.html.
3 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/07/060706-modern-pirates.html.
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2. Some facts about contemporary piracy
A major objective of pirates is valuable cargo (Kahn 1995;
Rosenberg 2009; Kraska and Wilson 2008). Indeed the increasing
volume of oil, arms and other valuable exports is a reason for high
piracy levels (Rosenberg 2009; Kraska and Wilson 2008). 12% of the
world's oil supply passes through the Gulf of Aden, and much through
Nigerian waters and the Straits of Malacca: these are the world's
major piracy hubs. Our main model, in which we assume that suc-
cessful pirates seize the ship's cargo, captures this motive. However,
our main conclusions remain unchanged if successful pirates merely
seek a ransom4 (see Appendix), provided this ransom is an increasing
function of cargo value, as is the practice in such cases (Carbin, 2009).5
Our stress on patrolling may be disputed on the ground that
patrol interventions to prevent pirate attacks have been rare. How-
ever, our focus is on the deterrent effect of stringent policing and
penalties: where these prevail and complement merchants' self-
insurance, piracies would not be attempted at all. If patrolling is
effective, actual interventions would be rare. Thus, coordinated
patrolling of the Straits of Malacca by Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia from 2004 reduced the probability of pirate attacks to
.00019 in 2005. Of course, pirates deterred by patrols in one region
may shift focus elsewhere so that the world-wide frequency of piracy
may not fall without global increase in patrols. Intriguingly, more
than 200 years ago, Jefferson proposed constant patrolling by navies
of different countries to reduce piracy. However, his plan could not
be implemented due to the financial impotence of the U.S. Congress
(Kahn, 1995).
Could crews effectively defend merchant vessels against pirates?
Probably not: most governments actively discourage merchant sea-
men from carrying arms (Kahn, 1995) and most ship-owners concur
because of the cost of training civilians in using arms, the risk of lethal
collateral damage to innocent outsiders and to themselves and
their ship, the reluctance of other countries to allow merchant ships
bearing arms to enter their waters and the possibility of hijacking by
the armed crewmen themselves (Carbin, 2009). We have accordingly
assumed that active defense against piracy requires external
patrolling.
3. A model without self-insurance
We define a pirate-infested sea as one in which there is an
infinitely elastic supply of pirates prepared to attack any vessel
whenever their expected income from doing so is positive. We
assume that all agents have perfect knowledge of all the parameters
and variables of the model. Pirates, for instance, know not only the
intensity of patrolling but also the value of the cargo of each vessel.
Some justification is lent to this assumption by recent evidence that
pirates typically have inside information from secret agents in
shipping companies or crews about freight values, route plans and
the like. Merchants know the likelihood of rescue in the event of a
pirate attack. We also assume that both pirates and traders are risk-
neutral — so that conventional insurance by outside agencies is
unprofitable. We show however that there exists a form of self-
insurance against piracy that is open to the merchant — and it is on
this option that our paper focuses.
A pirate who attacks a merchant ship hopes to capture a cargo of
value C, but fears seizure and consequent punishment amounting
to S. p, the probability of seizure, is an increasing function of the
intensity of patrolling. The pirate's expected income from his venture
will be
1–pð ÞC–pS:
Piracy will be worthwhile if
C N C⁎ pð Þ = pS = 1–pð Þ
where C*(p) is increasing in p
C′ pð Þ = S 1 + p= 1–pð Þ½ = 1–pð Þ N 0:
The merchant, while contemplating the voyage, considers the
profit π(C) he hopes for if successful, the expected likelihood of a
successful pirate attack (which is 0 for C≤C* and 1−p for C NC*) and
the cost f(C) he will incur in the event of such an attack (which will
vary with the booty he carries: f′(C)N0). We assume that there will be
no more than one pirate attack per voyage: this is plausible because if
the attack is successful, the vessel will no longer have a cargo to attract
pirates while if it fails, that would be due to intervention by a patrol,
which presumably escorts the ship to safety.6 There are economies of
scale in shipping — π′(C)Nπ(C)/C. A profit function of this kind –
which we adopt only on account of its simplicity – is
π Cð Þ = −a + bC
where profits are a fixed fraction bb1 of the value of the cargo less the
fixed cost a of the voyage. In the event of a successful pirate attack, the
merchant loses his entire cargo C and the fixed cost of his voyage a.
We assume that this is all he loses.
f Cð Þ = a + C:
The merchant's expected income π1(C) if he risks the voyage
amounts to
π1 Cð Þ = p bC–að Þ– 1–pð Þ C + að Þ
= p 1 + bð Þ–1½ C–a
if C NC* and
bC–a
if C≤C*. The voyage will be profitable if
p 1 + bð Þ N 1 and C NC = a = p 1 + bð Þ–1½ 
(with C decreasing in p) when C NC*, and if
C N a= b
when Cb C*.
4. A model with self-insurance
This however is not our main focus. We have assumed so far that
the merchant's cargo is exogenously determined. But the merchant
has another option: he could divide up his cargo into lots, each no
larger than C* to eliminate the risk of piracy altogether. He could in
effect insure himself, and since this would lead to diseconomies of
small-scale shipment, such self-insurance could create moral hazard.
Intensification of patrolling, by increasing the likelihood of seizure of
4 Leeson (2009c) describes how many contemporary pirates do this.
5 Carbin states that the ransom is for the safe delivery of the ship, its cargo and its
crew, and accordingly ships carrying cargo of greater value were willing to negotiate
higher ransom.
6 We make this assumption for simplicity and also because it is in line with our
general framework: (1) rational well-informed pirates who would not waste their
time attacking an already plundered vessel, and (2) ships that depend primarily on
maritime police for their defense (so that those that have foiled one attack are likely
currently to be in the care of a naval convoy and so invulnerable to a second attack). Of
course, occasionally one or both these assumptions may be violated.
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pirates, may induce neglect of costly self-insurance, and increase the
actual incidence of piracy.
Would it?We compare themerchant's expected profit π1(C) when
he risks pirate attack with his profit π2(C, n) when he splits his cargo
into lots that eliminate this risk (where C=nC*+R with integral n
and RbC*). When CbC*, there is no piracy risk and the merchant
trades whenever CNa/b (which implies pS/(1−p)NCNa/b). But
when CNC*, the options diverge:
π1 Cð Þ = p 1 + bð Þ–1½ C–a and π2 C;nð Þ = bC– n + 1ð Þa:
The merchant will run the risk of piracy whenever π1(C)Nπ2(C, n)
or
1–pð Þ 1 + bð ÞC b na:
He will split his cargo into (n+1) lots when this inequality is
reversed. This leads to
Theorem 1. If pNa/(1+b)S, the merchant always insures against
piracy. If pba/(1+b)S, he always risks piracy.
Proof. pNa/(1+b)S implies
C⁎ = Sp= 1–pð Þ N a= 1 + bð Þ 1–pð Þ:
When C lies between nC* and (n+1)C*,
C N nC⁎ N na= 1 + bð Þ 1–pð Þ Or 1 + bð Þ 1–pð ÞC N na;
so that the merchant eliminates the chance of pirate attack by
splitting his cargo into (n+1) lots for any C in this interval. Since n
can be any integer, this establishes the result for all C.
We prove the converse result, for pba/(1+b)S, by induction.
Assume that π2((m−1)C*, m− 1)≤π1((m−1)C*). Then, for any C
between (m−1)C* and mC*,
π2 C;mð Þ = π2 m–1ð ÞC⁎;m–1ð Þ + bR–a
π1 Cð Þ = π1 m–1ð ÞC⁎ð Þ + p 1 + bð Þ–1½ R:
Now, pba/(1+b)S implies
C⁎ = Sp= 1–pð Þba = 1 + bð Þ 1–pð Þ:
So; RbC⁎ba= 1 + bð Þ 1–pð Þ
or p 1 + bð Þ–1½ R– bR–að Þ N 0:
Further, by assumption
π1 m–1ð ÞCð Þ≥π2 m–1ð ÞC⁎;m–1ð Þ:
So π1 (C)Nπ2 (C, m) for all C between (m−1)C* and mC*. In
particular, π1(mC*)Nπ2 (mC*, m)— so that we can repeat the exercise
for C between mC* and (m+1)C*.
Finally, to complete the proof by induction, note that π1(C*)N
π2(C*, 1).
Theorem 1 implies that there is no moral hazard. Increased
security for shipping never reduces and may actually increase the
incentive for self-insurance. The intuitive explanation is that it raises
the threshold value of cargo C* below which pirates would not bother
to risk an operation. This encourages merchants to restrict shipments
to this limit — an effect which more than offsets the temptation to
avoid the costs of self-insurance as patrolling is intensified.
An interesting corollary of our model is that p and S are exactly
symmetrical in their effects. An increase in p could be substituted by
an equiproportional increase in S: higher penalties for captured
pirates would have the same effects as increased patrolling. This
is crucial for self-insurance: it can be argued that economies of
scale in shipping are so dominant (‘a’ so high) that, with a given S,
pNa/(1+b)S may not be achievable (since p can never exceed unity)
and traders may not therefore self-insure. However, an adequate
increase in penalties could always do the trick. A major problem with
anti-piracy operations is that most governments are reluctant to try
captured pirates “on location” for fear of violating international law
and so often allow them to go scot-free (Leeson, 2010; 2011).
Theorem 1 also means that no piracies will be attempted either
when C≤C* or when pNa/(1+b)S. Given a cumulative distribution F
(C) of cargoes (prior, that is, to any decision to split them up for
insurance against piracy) and a total number of voyages M, the
number of piracies attempted will be
N = M 1–F C⁎ pð Þf g½  for pba= 1 + bð ÞS
and 0 for p N a= 1 + bð ÞS:
We assume that F(a/b)=0 — no voyages are proposed with
cargoes that guarantee losses even in the absence of pirate attacks. N
decreases in p up to the level p=a/(1+b)S — and then drops
abruptly to zero. We can couple this piracy function with a function p
(N) that depicts the international community's response in terms of
intensity of patrolling to the piracies to figure out the equilibrium rate
of piracy. However, the point of our exercise is that if the powers that
be sustain a level of patrolling (and symmetrically a penalty for
captured pirates) that ensures pNa/(1+b)S even when there are no
piracies, the pirate menace will be taken care of by the self-insurance
on the part of merchants.
Appendix. Piracy for ransom
Assume that successful pirates secure a ransom instead of stealing
a ship and its cargo. Hence, the loss of the merchant in case of a
successful pirate attack is now
f Cð Þ = R Cð Þ = X + yC: ðA1Þ
Ransom, R(C), is an increasing function of cargo (yN0). X is
independent of cargo (perhaps the ransom value of the ship and the
crew). Without self-insurance, a pirate attacks if
1–pð Þ X + yCð Þ–pS N 0 or if C N pS= 1–pð Þ–X½ = y = C  pð Þ: ðA2Þ
C*′(p)=S/y(1−p)2N0 so this threshold is increasing in p. As in
our main model, if CbC*(p), no piracies are attempted and the
merchant's profit is bC−a, where a, the fixed cost, includes payment
for the ship and the crew, so that he makes a voyage provided CNa/b.
If CNC*(p), a merchant has to risk piracy and his profit is
π1 Cð Þ = bC–a– 1–pð Þ yC + Xð Þ = b– 1–pð Þy½ C–a– 1–pð ÞX: ðA3Þ
A profitable voyage requires pyNy−b and CN [a+(1−p)X] /
[b−(1−p)y]=C(p) (again, decreasing in p). Voyages without
self-insurance are profitable only for cargoes above this threshold.
With self-insurance, if CNC*(p), a merchant will split his cargo
into n+1 lots−n of size C*, and the balance BbC* (his total cargo
C=nC*+B) rather than risk pirate attack iff π2(C, n)=bC−(n+1)
aNπ1(C), or iff
1−pð Þ yC + Xð Þ N na: ðA4Þ
Using this relationship, we establish two results:
1. Appendix Result 1: If pbp=(a+X)/(2S+X), a merchant never
self-insures.
Proof: Consider an integer n and any C between nC* and (n+1)C*,
C=nC*+B where BbC*.
Now, pbp implies pb(a+X)/ [S (1+1/n)+X] for all nN1.
Simplifying and substituting C*=[pS/(1−p)−X]/y, this reduces
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to (1−p)[y(n+1)C*+X]bna. Since Cb(n+1)C*, it follows that
(1−p)[yC+X]bna. (A4) then means no self-insurance for any C.
2. Appendix Result 2: If pNp*=(a+X)/(S+X), merchants always
self-insure irrespective of the size of their cargo (restricting
ourselves to CNC*, as below there is no risk of piracy and hence
no need for self-insurance).
Proof: pNp* implies pN [a+X(1−1/n)]/ [S+X(1−1/n)] (for all
positive n), which, on simplification and substitution of C*=[pS/
(1−p)−X]/y, yields (1−p)(ynC*+X)Nna. Since C=nC*+
BNnC*, it follows that (1−p)(yC+X)Nna. (A4) means self-
insurance for all C.
Low enough patrolling or penalties destroy the incentive for self-
insurance, while intensive patrolling or high penalties, far from
causing moral hazard, actually encourages self-insurance.
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